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Introduction 
In the theoretical context of ‘attention research’ the distinction between 
‘controlled’ and ‘automatic’ processing has emerged. (e.g., Posner and Snyder 
(1975) and Shiffrin and Schneider (1977)) The terms are defined as mutually 
exclusive, e.g., cognitive processing is either controlled, voluntary and conscious 
or automatic, involuntary and unconscious. This leaves no room for explanations 
of, e.g., skills which probably require an analysis in terms of ‘unconscious 
control’ or ‘controlled automaticity’. 
Although this view has been challenged (e.g., Jonides et.al. (1985), Neuman 
(1987), Ryan (1983), its basic assumptions are still rather taken for granted 
among many cognitive psychologists. I argue that the distinction suffers from a 
serious lack of explanatory value and that the fundamental problem lies in the 
fact that these two terms have, by some researchers, been defined as mutually 
exclusive. I will here give an account of the basic conjectures which implicitly 
frame such a scheme. 
I will argue that the distinction's conceptual origin can be found: 
• In our every-day use of the terms ‘controlled’ and ‘automatic’, respectively. I 
think that the terms' literal meanings as well as their employment in ‘folk-
psychology’ (i.e., every-day language of human mind and action) have heavily 
influenced this theoretical approach. 
• In phenomenological considerations; the feeling of being in control or not 
being in control of one's actions and the feeling of controlling one's own thought 
processes. 
• In a confusion between epistemological awareness and phenomenal 
consciousness. Control may require access to that which is controlled, but not 
experience of the same. 
• In Descartes' dualistic view of human behaviour, he distinguished between 
behaviour that was elicited within the body and behaviour which has its cause in 
internal will.  
  
1. The every-day meaning of ‘automaticity’ and ‘control’ 
The terms ‘automatic’ and ‘control’, respectively, have a place in every-day 
language. Folk-psychology has successfully taken up on these terms and uses 
them in a derived sense, e.g., in ‘acting automatically’, and ‘to be in control of 
one's feelings’. When we employ them in yet another context namely that of 
cognitive psychology we must, however, be very careful. In every-day 
psychology the terms are used with no ontological implications, a person may 
under ordinary circumstances be said to ‘act automatically’, with the question of 
whether she therefore is an automaton left completely open. 
‘Automatic‘ 
As is the case with most of our psychological vocabulary, ‘automatic’ in 
characterisations of mental processes or behaviour is used in a metaphorical 
sense. Literally, an automatic (mechanical) device is self-regulating and works 
without direct and continuing human operation and supervision. It may need 
someone to turn the machinery on, but thereafter it is working all by itself. The 
automaton is dependent on a human being to be around and turn it on. A robot is 
automatic in this sense. In folk psychology, the term is employed in descriptions 
of a special mode of human behaviour. According to the Wordsworth Concise 
English Dictionary acting automatically is defined as ‘acting without thinking’, 
‘acting without conscious volition’, ‘suspension of control by the conscious 
mind’. The metaphor likens the ‘mind’ or ‘the thought’ to that person (or 
likewise) who presses the button and turns the machine on. 
‘Control’ 
To ‘control’ something basically means ‘to see that it is accurately done’. The 
means to obtain control may differ as long as they include supervision and the 
ability (and right) to interfere. 
Our everyday intuitions about human control include control over different kinds 
of (automatic) processes, as well as control over other human beings, 
respectively. Control over a process is described in terms of supervision, 
guidance, direction, regulation, and the right to initiate and stop a process at any 
arbitrary moment. Control over other human beings can be described in the same 
terms. However, the question of control over other human beings has a moral 
dimension, which control over e.g., factory processes lacks. Controlling other 
people entails that their wills and intentions are secondary to those of the 
controller. 
A typical example of the first kind of control is the situation of a business 
executive. She is not directly concerned with what is happening on, i.e., the 
production-line. The major role of the executive lies in planning and dealing with 
novel situations. The people who works in the production are, however, also 
executing control. Their task may be to monitor the band and watch for deficit 
products in order to throw them away as they come. 
In the theoretical framework of automatic and controlled cognitive processing 
the executive's role have been taken up on, while the workers functions have 
been overlooked. In a factory, there is a hierarchy of control processes and in 
order to execute control on one level, knowledge of the overall end is not 
required.  
  
2. Metaphors in every-day language and in psychological theory 
When we use metaphors a frequent problem arises: the term's literal meaning 
involves some unwanted features along with those for which the term is picked. 
The term ‘automatic’ has its conceptual home-base in the world of mechanical 
devices. The meaning ‘functioning without continuing human control’ has 
unfortunately accompanied the term ‘automatic’. In its derived sense, it gives a 
picture of a person being split into partly the controller, partly the automatic 
process. This is the case for our every-day use of ‘acting automatically’ as well 
as for psychological theorising; it becomes, however, more problematic in the 
latter case. The reason is that in ordinary language we do not have to deal with 
the metaphysical consequences of our language, but when we use a term 
intending it to have explanatory power, an implicit metaphysical claim is often 
made. In Descartes' theory this claim is both explicit and intended as the body is 
conceived as a literal automaton which, within certain limits, can regulate itself. 
The soul is the human being which plays the part of the controller. The very 
terms ‘automaton’ and ‘automatic’ thus indicate that we can successfully divide 
human behaviour into those that emanate from the body and those that have their 
origin in ‘the self’ or ‘the will’ or ‘consciousness’. 
According to the hypothesis that the mind works as an information processor the 
following picture emerges: Control is executed by a ‘central processor‘ (or 
‘operating system‘ Johnson-Laird 1983, ‘supervisory system‘ Norman&Shallice 
1986, Shallice 1988, ‘an executive system‘ Logan&Cowan 1984). The central 
processor has, however, a limited capacity. The majority of cognitive processes 
takes place in parallel, outside the central processor and does not interfere with 
the tasks of the processor. Controlled processing is slow, serial, effortful, 
capacity-limited, subject to interference and can be interrupted. By definition, 
controlled processes are under direct conscious control of the central processor, 
which forms intentions and issues commands to realise these intentions. The role 
of the central processor is to initiate and inhibit cognitive operations. 
The tasks of the ‘central processor’ resemble those of a business executive and 
the overall control system of the human mind is, according to this view, strongly 
analogous to that of a business corporation. The control processes are not 
concerned with domain-specific detail. Low-level ‘production-line’ functions can 
run along with only intermittent intervention from the executive, the major role 
of the executive lies in planning and dealing with novel situations. 
Our intuitions about cognitive ‘control’, as well as those of ‘automaticity’ are, 
thus, coloured by the every-day use of the term. One of these is that the 
controller and the controlled are functionally separate, which leads to the 
conclusion that a process cannot control itself. Another is that the ‘important 
decisions’ are made by one single entity. 
In every-day life we also talk about how one person can control another. To 
execute control over other human beings, in this sense, is to make them do what 
the we want. Control in its derived sense has consequently also been regarded as 
closely connected to our will powers. As a result, ‘the controller’ has implicitly 
been defined as a functional equivalent to our every-day notion of ‘the will’.  
  
3. The relation between consciousness and control 
The definition of ‘automatic’ and ‘controlled’ processing are partly made in 
terms of consciousness. Posner and Snyder proposes three operational criteria to 
distinguish automatic processing. One is that an automatic process occurs 
without giving rise to conscious awareness. 
Control is therefore (explicitly or implicitly) equated to conscious control. The 
central processor is the functional equivalent to phenomenal consciousness. The 
origin of this idea lies partly in phenomenological experience. A general 
experience of being in control colours many of our conscious experiences. The 
wrong conclusion has therefore been drawn that control is functionally 
dependent on consciousness. 
Umiltà (1988) who is an proponent for this view suggests that consciousness has 
the function of control and that voluntary control over cognitive processes 
depends on the phenomenal experience of being conscious. It is the very fact that 
we have phenomenal experience of a process that brings it under voluntary 
control. The question is, how did experience get into the picture, is it not enough 
with knowledge about the controlled process to execute control? We can easily 
imagine and grant, that the controller has to know something about the process 
she is supposed to control, if she is to be able to in some sense monitor the 
ongoing processes. Whether the controller must have a special kind of 
experience of the process in question is, however, debatable. 
One possible underlying cause of this picture is, thus, the conflation of 
phenomenal experience and epistemological awareness. No one honestly 
believes that just because ‘being in control’ has a certain ‘feel’ to it, the ‘feel’ is 
the control. Implicitly, however, this is the underlying and taken for granted idea. 
The feeling of controlling oneself in combination with the fact that it seems as if 
the controlling device must have access to the controlled processes 
concomitantly lead to the wrong conclusion: that access has to be phenomenal. 
Does awareness imply experience? 
From all possible meanings of consciousness we can elicit three which are 
especially important here: 
1. Phenomenal consciousness. The experience of seeing, hearing et cetera, the-
what-it- is-like character. 
2. Subjective awareness. The ability to report. X is subjectively aware of Y if he/
she can verbally report Y. (Also called ‘access consciousness’.) 
3. Objective awareness. X is objectively aware of content/state/event Y if Y is 
used to guide X's actions. If X can make a discriminatory response between Y 
and Z. (Also a kind of ‘access consciousness’.) 
From these uses we can extract two basic meanings of being ‘conscious’, that 
which has to do with experience and that which describes knowledge in some 
sense. In the case of objective and subjective awareness, the first may be 
described as an expression of procedural knowledge and the second as 
declarative knowledge. 
Eriksen (1960) proposes that ‘awareness’ may be defined as the ability to make a 
discriminatory response. Thus, if the subject reports lack of awareness but 
nevertheless is able to make a discriminatory response, the subject is objectively 
aware. Eriksen has an interesting point here; any definition of ‘awareness’ in 
terms of verbalisation entails that language can adequately represent the richness 
of subjective experiences. Further, such definition excludes voluntary responses 
other than verbal reports. For instance, take the case of driving a car. I may not 
be subjectively aware of exactly what I am doing when I have my thoughts 
somewhere else, but apparently I am aware in some sense, because I respond 
accurately to sudden turns of the road, red lights in front of me, and I can 
regulate the current speed of the car. 
If we define ‘awareness‘ in this manner, we may be aware of something and at 
the same time not experience it.  
  
4. The relation between what we want and what we control 
Another of Posner and Synder's criteria for automatic processes is that they occur 
‘without intention’. 
The ambiguity of the concept ‘intention’ is of pivotal importance here. As 
Anscombe (1963) points out, there is the meaning of intention as a state of mind, 
on one hand, and the characterisation of actions as intentional, on the other. 
Which of these uses do Posner & Snyder refer to? They could be using 
‘intention‘ as meaning a conscious state of mind, but then the criterion seems a 
bit superfluous since they have another criterion (see above) which excludes 
conscious awareness altogether. If they, on the other hand, mean that automatic 
processing can never be intentional, meaning ‘deliberate’ or ‘voluntary’ slightly 
different problems ensue. This leads to a non-satisfactory exclusion of the 
possible existence of voluntary processes which are unconscious in some sense 
(e.g., different kinds of ‘skills´).  
  
5. The scope of dualism 
The conceptual origin to the definitions of ‘automatic processes’ and ‘controlled 
processes’, lies partly in our every-day tendency to think in dualistic terms, 
which in this case, presents itself in this particular choice of metaphors. These 
every-day intuitions get a theoretical framework in the philosophy of Descartes. 
My main point is that the distinction between two different kinds of cognitive 
processing reflect a dualistic view of behaviour which is a philosophical 
inheritance from Descartes. He distinguished between behaviour which is 
elicited within the body, and behaviour which has its origin in internal will. 
Descartes took his methodological departure in phenomenology. We experience 
that we are controlling some behaviour but not other. These phenomenological 
reflections were turned into ontology; behaviour which do not have the feeling of 
control ‘attached’ to it cannot, according to his views, have been initiated by the 
soul. In Cartesian terms the distinction does have an explanatory value: we have 
two kinds of behaviour (mental processing) because one is guided by the soul 
while the other is elicited in the body, which, by the way, is a literal automaton. 
However, the sad part is that the Cartesian agenda leaves neither room for 
conscious experiences which are not voluntary (e.g., when we find ourselves 
‘automatically drawn’ to a bright light or a strong noise) nor for unconscious 
processes which are voluntary (e.g., the early processing of sensory information 
regarding an object we have decided to look at, or the neural processes which 
elicits movement of a leg.)  
  
Summary 
The strong connection between consciousness and control resides in a dualistic 
metaphysics. In Descartes' theory this conclusion is drawn upon the facts that we 
on some occasions experience that we have control and that all our experiences 
‘belong to the soul’. We can, however, not force phenomenology into 
functionality. The experience of control does not explain control, nor does it 
imply it. I argue that the Cartesian view persists in the distinction between 
‘automatic’ and ‘controlled processing’ as it is formulated by e.g., Posner and 
Snyder (1975) and Shiffrin and Schneider (1977). Their views presuppose a 
strong version of dualism. 
Our every-day intuitions of ‘automatic’ versus ‘controlled’ actions reflect the 
same basic dualistic idea, but since meaning in every-day language is allowed to 
be in-exact the distinction does not here entail the same metaphysical 
implications. As long as we do not intend to explain these actions we do not have 
to subscribe to any metaphysics. 
Our natural inclination for dualistic views and solutions seem to be difficult to 
overcome, which is remarkably salient in modern philosophy of mind. (See e.g., 
F. Radovic 1998)  
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